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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]here is no liberty if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers.”1 
In the United States, redistricting is defined as the redrawing of 
congressional and state legislative district boundaries every ten 
years, following a United States Census.2 Redistricting is intended to 
ensure that all voters in a district are fairly and reasonably equally 
represented by their House and state legislative representatives. 
Underlying the redistricting process—which is typically conducted 
within each state—is an inherent objective to safeguard the electoral 
process fairly and impartially.3 “[D]rawing lines for congressional 
districts is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to 
ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance.”4 
Regardless of how impartial redistricting is intended to be, it is 
often conducted by partisan elected officials (namely, state legislative 
bodies) who have vested interests in both protecting their own 
incumbency and protecting or expanding their political party’s 
opportunity to get their chosen candidates elected.5 Federal and state 
courts have repeatedly recognized that state legislatures have 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring the federal government to conduct a 
census every ten years for the purpose of apportioning U.S. House of Representatives 
seats among the states). 
 3. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (“The object of districting is to 
establish ‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’” (citation omitted)). 
 4. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 410–13 (explaining how Democrats drew district maps in the 
1990s with the express goal of winning more seats and how Republicans did the same 
following the 2000 census). 
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primacy in the redistricting process6 and that it is an inherently 
political process.7 While these are not unexpected considerations, it 
also has been recognized that the redistricting process can produce 
efforts to manipulate political boundaries in favor of certain parties, 
resulting in “gerrymandered” districts—that reflect desired political 
outcomes more than a balanced representation of the electorate.8 
Such districts are frequently oddly shaped, and neither conform to 
obvious geographic, county, or municipal boundaries nor reflect 
natural communities of interest. 
Gerrymandering can be based on any number of theories related 
to maximizing a party’s opportunities to increase or maintain power, 
including: managing how persons of a particular minority group are 
included in (or excluded from) districts; incumbent protection plans 
that minimize the number of incumbents who are paired in a redrawn 
district or who must represent a different group of individuals than in 
the past; or partisan gerrymandering that seeks to consolidate or 
divide partisan voters. Gerrymandering around groups of voters is 
said to work most often through the “cracking” and “packing” of 
voters.9 By definition, “[c]racking means dividing a party’s supporters 
among multiple districts so that they fall short of a majority in each 
one[,] [while] [p]acking means concentrating one party’s backers in a 
few districts that they win by overwhelming margins.”10 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that certain 
forms of packing and cracking are illegal11 and, if proven, will result 
 
 6. See id. at 414 (Article I of the Constitution “leaves with the States primary 
responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts.”) 
(quoting Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993)). 
 7. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (“The Constitution clearly contemplates districting 
by political entities . . . and unsurprisingly that turns out to be root-and-branch a 
matter of politics.”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is 
that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences.”). 
 8. See Erick Trickey, Where Did the Term “Gerrymander” Come From?, 
SMITHSONIAN (July 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/where-did-
term-gerrymander-come-180964118/ [https://perma.cc/7WL9-W48Y]. For 
example, an 1812 Massachusetts district was “freakishly shaped” in order to elect 
Democratic-Republican senators. See id. This district gave rise to the term 
“gerrymander” when opponents of Governor Elbridge Gerry noted that the district 
looked like a salamander, “a satire so piercing, it has overshadowed all of Gerry’s 
other accomplishments in history.” Id. 
 9. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018). 
 10. Id. 
 11. E.g., racial gerrymandering in violation of the Voting Rights Act 
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in declaring a district or state redistricting map to be 
unconstitutional.12 This is because, under the United States 
Constitution, fair representation requires that one person’s vote 
should not carry any more weight than another person’s vote.13 
However, partisan gerrymandering presents one of the more unique 
and thornier issues facing the judiciary today. Partisan 
gerrymandering—sometimes known as political gerrymandering—is 
defined as “the drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate 
adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in 
power.”14 
On the one hand, state legislatures—and generally the majority 
party of the legislative bodies—have primacy in redrawing 
congressional and legislative district boundaries. Moreover, Congress 
and state legislatures are inherently political bodies. Despite this 
reality, the Court has held that negative presumptions should not 
automatically attach to legislative plans.15 Additionally, it is expected 
and accepted that political goals will play a role in redistricting 
conducted by state legislatures.16 
On the other hand, overly-partisan gerrymandering has been a 
concern since the early days of the republic, as its effect on 
representation can lead to profound impacts on a wide variety of 
 
 12. See id. See also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (holding racial 
gerrymandering in violation of §2 of the Voting Rights Act to be illegal). 
 13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“Simply stated, an individual’s 
right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in 
a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living on other 
parts of the State.”). 
 14. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2658 (2015). While the term “political redistricting” is commonly used to describe 
drawing districts with political party affiliation as a key criteria, as previously noted 
all redistricting is political to some extent. Therefore, we use the term “partisan 
redistricting” throughout this article to reference potential gerrymandering based on 
political party affiliation, unless quoting a source that itself uses the term “political 
redistricting.” See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417 
(2006) (using “partisan gerrymandering” in a context similar to that defined in this 
article) (“[P]artisan gerrymandering . . . [r]educes the likelihood that . . . 
representatives elected from gerrymandered districts will act as vigorous advocates 
for the needs and interests of [those] who reside within their districts.”). 
 15. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 416. 
 16. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“The reality is that 
districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political 
consequences.”). 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss5/1
  
2019] PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 5 
significant political issues of the day.17 Furthermore, technology has 
increased the accuracy and sophistication of political mapmaking, 
giving rise to the creation of partisan advantages during the 
redistricting process.18 And as technology advances, more extreme 
partisan gerrymandering becomes feasible.19 Unsurprisingly, the 
body of judicial opinions addressing gerrymandering has expanded 
over time, as this article discusses in more detail.20 In these contexts, 
the United States Supreme Court has, in more recent years, felt 
compelled to identify overly-partisan gerrymandering as a potentially 
unconstitutional act. 
The increasing focus on partisan gerrymandering results in a 
fundamental tension around the judiciary’s involvement in partisan 
gerrymandering issues. The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that redistricting is required under the United States Constitution 
because it is critical to fair elections in a representative democracy. 
Consequently, gerrymandered redistricting plans that frustrate this 
constitutional obligation impliedly create “claims” or “controversies” 
that courts must address, despite the obvious justiciability questions 
implicated by these cases.21 
 
 17. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004) (citation omitted) (“Political 
gerrymanders are not new to the American scene. One scholar traces them back to 
the Colony of Pennsylvania at the beginning of the 18th century, where several 
counties conspired to minimize the political power of the city of Philadelphia by 
refusing to allow it to merge or expand into surrounding jurisdictions, and denying it 
additional representatives.”). 
 18. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“But 
technology makes today’s gerrymandering altogether different from the crude 
linedrawing of the past. New redistricting software enables pinpoint precision in 
designing districts. With such tools, mapmakers can capture every last bit of partisan 
advantage, while still meeting traditional districting requirements (compactness, 
contiguity, and the like).”); Vann R. Newkirk II, Partisan Gerrymandering Stands, for 
Now, THE ATLANTIC (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/partisan-gerrymandering-
stands-for-now/563063/ [https://perma.cc/3MTH-F545]. 
 19. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1941. 
 20. See infra Part III.C. 
 21. See generally Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) (finding a justiciable 
controversy where North Carolina officials drew district lines on the basis of race 
despite their claims of political motivations); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973) (determining that reapportionment plans are acceptable when they secure 
partisan fairness); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring states to 
reapportion their districts based upon changes in population). 
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At what point should such an inherently political process be 
subject to judicial review for being “too” political? More importantly, 
to what extent might the judiciary be injuring its own authority as an 
independent, non-partisan branch of government when it must 
decide for or against a particular political party in partisan 
gerrymandering cases—especially in such an increasingly polarized 
political environment? This article attempts to answer these 
questions, focusing not only on how these problems arise, but also 
potential solutions. 
First, this article focuses on the judiciary’s unique and specific 
role as one of three branches of government in the United States; the 
limitations of the judiciary with respect to addressing political 
questions under the political question doctrine; and the general 
criticisms of the judiciary’s involvement in highly-politicized cases.22 
Second, this article discusses the evolution of gerrymandering claims 
that have come before the United States Supreme Court, starting with 
early cases where the Court explained its rationale for evaluating 
gerrymandering claims, and culminating with an examination of more 
recent partisan gerrymandering decisions.23 Finally, this article 
concludes by proposing a standard for assessing undue political 
manipulation of the redistricting process and identifies steps the 
judiciary might take to uphold its integrity when deciding such 
difficult questions.24 
II. THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN POLITICAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 
Before turning to the specific issue of political gerrymandering, it 
is important to first identify the judiciary’s specific role in a 
government premised on a separation of powers and to set forth long-
standing considerations for judicial involvement in politically-
charged legal claims. This section examines the tension between the 
judiciary’s obligation to serve as a non-political check on the other 
branches of government, and its desire to stay out of political issues 
to maintain public faith and the basic integrity of the judicial system. 
Next, this section shows how the fundamental tensions in this area 
existed well before reaching such highly political and specific issues 
like legislative redistricting. Finally, this section recognizes how, in 
recent years, the United States Supreme Court has issued politically-
 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
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charged decisions, and has struggled to maintain public faith in the 
integrity of the subsequent outcomes.25 
A. Role of the Judiciary 
To understand the scope of the courts’ potential involvement in 
redistricting cases, it is first important to understand the judiciary’s 
role within the federal government. It is equally important to 
appreciate that state governments are similarly modeled on a 
separation of powers concept that divides the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of government. This overarching concept is 
crucial to understanding redistricting cases because they occur at the 
intersection between the three branches of government. 
At the federal level, Article III of the United States Constitution 
establishes the judicial branch, providing that the “judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”26 This branch of government differs significantly from the 
executive and legislative branches in that the members of the 
judiciary are appointed by the President and subsequently confirmed 
by the Senate,27 whereas members of the executive and legislative 
branches are elected. Federal judges serve life terms, removable only 
through impeachment proceedings held by the House of 
Representatives and subsequent conviction by the Senate.28 Granting 
lifetime appointments to federal judges “insulates them from the 
temporary passions of the public, and allows them to apply the law 
with only justice in mind, and not electoral or political concerns.”29 
Starting with Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison, and continuing through the present, the United 
States Supreme Court has carefully defined its role as an independent 
branch of government that functions as a check on the legislative 
branch, but nevertheless avoids answering purely political 
questions.30 The Supreme Court recognized early on that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
 
 25. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 27. Id. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 28. Id. art. III. 
 29. The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-
the-white-house/the-judicial-branch/ [https://perma.cc/HL4Q-6LJM]. 
 30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803). 
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what the law is.”31 This “power [of] judges to ‘say what the law is’ rests 
not on the default of politically accountable officers, but is instead 
grounded in and limited by the necessity of resolving, according to 
legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of legal right.”32 
“Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial department has no 
business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the 
question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no 
judicially enforceable rights.”33 As Justice Scalia pronounced in Vieth: 
“The judicial Power” created by Article III, § 1, of the 
Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do, or even 
whatever Congress chooses to assign them. It is the power to 
act in the manner traditional for English and American 
courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that 
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by 
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative 
Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law 
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions.34 
It is important to recall that Article III of the Constitution restricts 
judicial consideration to only those matters constituting “case[s] or 
controvers[ies].”35 This limitation means that a party has standing to 
seek judicial action only when suffering an injury that is “concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the 
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”36 In other 
words, courts existing under Article III may not issue advisory 
opinions,37 nor address general grievances.38 Thus, for any case—
including a redistricting case—to be heard by federal judges, it must 
first clear the hurdle of establishing standing. 
Finally, the constitutional limitations placed on the judiciary to 
“say what the law is” are “grounded in and limited by the necessity of 
resolving, according to legal principles, a plaintiff’s particular claim of 
legal right.”39 
 
 31. Id. at 177. 
 32. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (citation omitted). 
 33. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). 
 34. Id. at 278 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 35. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. 
 36. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 149, 149 (2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 37. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). 
 38. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992). 
 39. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018). 
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B. Political Question 
Judicial power is further limited when the claim made is one of a 
purely political nature—an issue of particular importance in political 
redistricting cases. The political question doctrine functions as “one 
of the rules basic to the federal system and [the Supreme] Court’s 
appropriate place within that structure.”40 Issues that are purely 
political in nature are considered “political questions” that are 
reserved for the legislative and executive branches. The political 
question doctrine has been central to historic arguments that the 
judiciary is not the appropriate forum to consider matters of political 
gerrymandering. 
Courts have long recognized the need to avoid encroachment 
upon the functions of the political branches. The political question 
doctrine dates back to Marbury v. Madison.41 In that case, the Supreme 
Court insisted that its role was “solely[] to decide on the rights of 
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, 
perform duties in which they have a discretion.”42 Similarly, more 
than two centuries later, the Court said, “[s]ometimes, however, the 
law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the 
claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of 
the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”43 
The political question doctrine is embedded in both 
“constitutional and prudential considerations,” and has been said to 
be “essentially a function of the separation of powers.”44 It exists 
principally so that courts may avoid “inappropriate[ly] interfer[ing] 
in the business of the other branches of Government.”45 Moreover, the 
political question doctrine highlights the inherent distinction 
between the judicial branch and the other two branches of 
 
 40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 278 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
 41. 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004). 
 44. JARED P. COLE, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: JUSTICIABILITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 6 (Dec. 23, 2014) (citation omitted), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVV5-9K2J]. 
 45. U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990). 
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government,46 and by doing so advances the separation of powers.47 
Further, by leaving wholly political questions to the coordinate 
branches, the judiciary can maintain the public’s faith in the 
judiciary’s ability to remain independent, remain free of undue 
political bias, and rely on precedent and good judgment even as it 
interprets the core laws of the land.48 
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court established six standards to 
identify the existence of a political question: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack 
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.49 
The Baker case involved a civil rights challenge to the 
redistricting of Tennessee’s electoral map.50 The Baker Court was 
presented with an argument that Tennessee had failed to redraw its 
legislative districts every ten years, as was required by the state 
 
 46. Compare the judicial branch—which, notably, at the federal level consists of 
appointed judges who are not subject to election or re-election—to the legislative and 
executive branches that are both comprised of elected officials who are subject to 
regular reelection. 
 47. “[T]he issue in the political question doctrine is not whether the 
constitutional text commits exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental 
function to one of the political branches[,]” but whether “the Constitution has given 
one of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature 
of such a power.” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (White, J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 48. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court’s authority . . . ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact 
and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting 
itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.”). 
 49. Id. at 217. 
 50. Id. at 187–88 (“The complaint[] alleg[es] that . . . these plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the law accorded them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the 
debasement of their votes . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
10
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constitution, which resulted in rural votes holding more weight than 
urban votes.51 The Supreme Court held that equal protection 
challenges to state legislature-drawn electoral maps were important, 
justiciable, and not barred by the political question doctrine.52 
This holding has been reaffirmed by several Supreme Court 
decisions, including Davis v. Bandemer, in which the majority stated 
that: 
Since Baker v. Carr, we have consistently adjudicated equal 
protection claims in the legislative districting context 
regarding inequalities in population between districts. In 
the course of these cases, we have developed and enforced 
the “one person, one vote” principle. Our past decisions also 
make clear that, even where there is no population deviation 
among the districts, racial gerrymandering presents a 
justiciable equal protection claim.53 
The Bandemer majority rejected the proposition that political 
redistricting cases may be non-justiciable, and further concluded that 
none of the previously established characteristics of a non-justiciable 
political question were present in that case.54 The majority also 
explained that a political gerrymandering case is, essentially, no less 
manageable than racial gerrymandering cases that the Court has 
found to be justiciable.55 Finally, a plurality of the Court concluded 
that the district court erred by finding the contested map violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, which is notable because the case was found 
to be justiciable merely by answering the question.56 
Interestingly, since Baker, the Supreme Court has only dismissed 
claims as non-justiciable under the political question doctrine on 
three occasions.57 One of these cases was Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case that 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 209–10. 
 53. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see 
also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 54. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143. More specifically, the Democrats claimed that an 
Indiana legislative reapportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander 
intended to disadvantage Democrats, which the Court ultimately found to be non-
justiciable. See id. 
 55. Id. at 125–27. 
 56. Id. at 129. 
 57. Vieth was one such case, and is discussed in depth in this article. See Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). One of the other two cases was Gilligan v. Morgan, in 
which the Supreme Court dismissed students’ attempts to bar the Governor of Ohio 
from summoning the National Guard to subdue civil disorder at universities as a 
nonjusticiable political question. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). Finally, in Nixon v. United States, 
11
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is discussed at length throughout this article.58 In Vieth, a four-Justice 
plurality determined that political gerrymandering questions are 
non-justiciable.59 Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, briefly 
addressed the Baker factors, remarking that “[t]hese tests are 
probably listed in descending order of both importance and 
certainty.”60 Ultimately, Justice Scalia determined that only the 
second Baker factor—concerning a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards—was at issue and analyzed this factor in light 
of the Court’s tradition and history: 
“The judicial Power” created by Article III, § 1, of the 
Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do, or even 
whatever Congress chooses to assign them. It is the power to 
act in the manner traditional for English and American 
courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that 
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by 
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative 
Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law 
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions.61 
The plurality further explained that political gerrymandering 
claims are non-justiciable political questions due to the absence of 
“judicially manageable standards.”62 
The political question doctrine raises a dichotomy that is at the 
very core of redistricting cases. Elections are fundamental to our 
nation’s representative democracy. Meanwhile, the judiciary is to 
avoid political divisiveness and retain public trust in order to fairly 
and reliably resolve disputes. Controversial political questions often 
present the closest cases of judicial infringement on other branches of 
government, and may present the greatest threat to faith and trust in 
the judicial system as a whole. 
 
the Supreme Court reviewed a federal judge’s claims that his impeachment trial 
violated Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the United States Constitution, because it was 
conducted by a committee of the Senate rather than by the full body. 506 U.S. 224 
(1993). The Nixon Court ultimately determined that the question was political in 
nature because there was a textual commitment to the Senate of the manner in which 
it might “try” a federal officer for impeachment. Id. at 237. 
 58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at 278. 
 61. Id. (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. at 310. 
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Yet, one can argue that an issue that is fundamental to the right 
to suffrage is among those in greatest need of resolution by a 
nonpartisan judiciary.63 Without an independent arbiter of politically 
charged actions that may threaten constitutional rights or the 
democratic process, the whole system would be placed at risk.64 This 
dichotomy highlights why the more political a claim or controversy 
becomes, the more complicated the issue is for a judicial body to 
address. 
Ultimately, the political question doctrine is a key consideration 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence and remains arguably unresolved in 
redistricting cases. As such, it must be considered with respect to any 
future review of reapportionment cases. 
C. Judicial Involvement in Other Highly-Politicized Matters 
The Supreme Court’s recent consideration of other highly-
politicized matters further demonstrates the importance of the 
political question doctrine. Moreover, these matters illustrate how 
judicial involvement in political controversies can influence the 
public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system, exemplifying the 
importance of “judicial restraint in resolving political disputes . . . .”65 
This article identifies some of the highest profile cases because they 
highlight how judicial involvement in political matters is detrimental 
to public perception of the Court’s impartiality and integrity. 
 
 63. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Gives Partisan Gerrymandering the 
Green Light—or at Least a Yellow Light, FINDLAW (May 12, 2004), 
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/the-supreme-court-gives-
partisan-gerrymandering-the-green-light-or-at-least-a-yellow-light.html 
[https://perma.cc/8E4P-RUPX] (“It is a basic principle of American constitutional 
law that in some circumstances, actors who are not politically accountable are better 
positioned to make the ground rules for those who are. Thus, we generally trust the 
courts to interpret the constitutional ground rules for politics because we think they 
are more likely to try to do the job fairly than are self-interested political actors. Even 
if the courts occasionally disappoint us by rendering what appear to be political 
judgments in the name of law, we can be certain that politicians will more often 
render political judgments, for that is the nature of their business.”). 
 64. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1935 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“More 
effectively every day, [partisan gerrymandering] enables politicians to entrench 
themselves in power against the people’s will. And only the courts can do anything to 
remedy the problem, because gerrymanders benefit those who control the political 
branches.”). 
 65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Perhaps one of the most well-known and highly-contentious 
cases in which the judiciary became entangled in politics is Bush v. 
Gore,66 which arguably cost the Supreme Court significant legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public. Bush v. Gore concerned the 2000 presidential 
election between George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr., and involved 
the Supreme Court analyzing a ruling by the Florida Supreme Court 
on vote recount procedures.67 The issue arose after several of 
Florida’s ballots were improperly punctured, resulting in “hanging 
chads.”68 The Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount of the votes, 
with recounted votes being evaluated according to the “intent of the 
voter.”69 
On review, the Supreme Court answered the question of 
“whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for 
resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, 
cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3 
U.S.C. § 5, and whether the standardless manual recounts violates the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.”70 The decision clearly 
divided the “conservative” and “liberal” wings of the Court. The 
majority ultimately identified a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause and determined that the appropriate remedy was to order an 
end to the recount, rather than order a new recount under established 
procedures.71 As a result, George W. Bush was identified as the winner 
of the electoral vote and sworn in as President, after a close election 
resolved by the United States Supreme Court on grounds some 
perceived to be partisan rather than legal in nature.72 
The Court’s acceptance of certiorari in Bush v. Gore exposed it to 
significant public scrutiny on two grounds that bear on other 
politically charged issues: (1) whether the Court had the legal 
authority to hear the case; and (2) whether the Court should have 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 104. See generally Samantha Levine, Hanging Chads: As the Florida 
Recount Implodes, the Supreme Court Decides Bush v. Gore, US NEWS (Jan. 17, 2008), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/the-legacy-of-hanging-
chads [https://perma.cc/G592-Q4XB]. 
 69. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105. 
 70. Id. at 103. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Jakob Brecheisen, Bush v. Gore: Can the Supreme Court’s Most Political 
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granted certiorari given its political implications.73 In its per curiam 
decision, the Court’s majority briefly acknowledged these concerns, 
stating that: 
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, 
for the problem of equal protection in election processes 
generally presents many complexities. 
The question before the Court is not whether local entities, 
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different 
systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are 
presented with a situation where a state court with the 
power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount 
with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a 
statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance 
that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and 
fundamental fairness are satisfied. 
. . . . 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial 
authority than are the Members of this Court, and none 
stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s design to 
leave the selection of the President to the people, through 
their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When 
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, 
however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve 
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has 
been forced to confront.74 
Thus, the Court seemed to focus its responsibility to hear the 
appeal on the fact that lower courts’ processes were at issue, and on 
that basis, stopped the recount.75 
However, the dissenting Justices argued extensively that because 
the case involved a presidential election rather than a “fundamental 
constitutional principle,”76 courts should not risk negatively 
impacting the reputation of the Court by gratuitously inserting 
themselves into questions of a political nature77: 
 
 73. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L.  
REV. 1093, 1094 (2001). 
 74. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109, 111. 
 75. Id. at 98–101 (per curiam) and 135 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 157 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 77. As stated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “‘[m]aybe the Court should have 
said, ‘We’re not going to take it, goodbye.’” Jeffry Toobin, Justice O’Connor Regrets, NEW 
YORKER (May 6, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justice-
oconnor-regrets [https://perma.cc/74S4-T3JB]. “The case, she said, . . . ‘stirred up the 
public’ and ‘gave the Court a less than perfect reputation.’” Id. 
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[I]n this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split 
decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s 
confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public 
treasure. . . . It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any 
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed the rule 
of law itself. . . . 
I fear that in order to bring this agonizingly long election 
process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately 
attended to that necessary “check upon our own exercise of 
power,” “our own sense of self-restraint.” Justice Brandeis 
once said of the Court, “The most important thing we do is 
not doing.” What it does today, the Court should have left 
undone.78 
Similarly, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion further highlighted 
the impact of the Bush v. Gore ruling on the national perception of the 
judicial branch of government: 
[The] position [of] the majority of this Court can only lend 
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges 
throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women 
who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone 
of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that 
confidence that will be inflicted by today’s decision. One 
thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know 
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this 
year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is 
perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as 
an impartial guardian of the rule of law.79 
Criticism of the Court’s foray into political waters in Bush v. Gore 
underscores the credibility the Supreme Court lost in rendering its 
decision.80 The Bush decision highlights the strong divide over when 
to grant review, and how judicial authority should be exercised in the 
context of elections. 
Bush v. Gore is not the only case that drew criticism for entangling 
judicial and political responsibilities. In Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, the Supreme Court struck down limits on 
 
 78. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 79. Id. at 128–129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 80. See Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1106 (“Bush v. Gore obviously cost the 
Supreme Court enormously in terms of its credibility. Over forty-nine million people 
voted for Al Gore, and undoubtedly virtually all of them regard the Court’s decision as 
a partisan ruling by a Republican majority in favor of the Republican candidate. Few 
cases, if any, in American history have been more widely perceived as partisan than 
Bush v. Gore.”). 
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corporations’ political campaign expenditures on the basis that 
corporations have the right to free speech under the First 
Amendment.81 Many have criticized Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in the Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision, particularly 
because the majority consisted of those Justices frequently identified 
as the conservative wing of the Court. 
Constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin called the decision 
“devastating,” asserting that “the decision will further weaken the 
quality and fairness of our politics” and can “stand beside the Court’s 
2000 decision in Bush v. Gore as an unprincipled political act with 
terrible consequences for the nation.”82 Richard Hasen criticized the 
majority opinion as judicial activism “sound[ing] more like the 
rantings of a right-wing talk show host than the rational view of a 
justice with a sense of political realism.”83 While such strong opinions 
are not necessarily avoidable, the nature and stridency of these 
criticisms are now more common in politically-charged cases. 
Several years later, in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court, in yet another five-to-four 
decision, upheld President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.84 The Court upheld the law’s requirement that most 
Americans obtain insurance or pay a penalty was authorized by 
Congress’s power to levy taxes.85 This time, however, the five-to-four 
split consisted of Chief Justice John G. Roberts joining the four Justices 
who were considered part of the liberal wing of the Court.86 This 
decision also drew criticism for being political, with critics stating that 
the Chief Justice “acted less like a judge than like a politician, and a 
slippery one.”87 
 
 81. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 82. Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 
25, 2010), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/25/the-devastating-
decision/ [https://perma.cc/7LJE-RA5F]. Richard Hasen is a nationally recognized 
expert in election law and campaign finance. 
 83. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance Reform, SLATE 
(Jan. 21, 2010), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/01/the-supreme-court-
kills-campaign-finance-reform-in-citizens-united.html [https://perma.cc/58HH-
PU4G]. 
 84. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Ramesh Ponnuru, In Health-Care Ruling, Roberts Writes His Own Law, 
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2012-
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These entanglements of the federal judiciary in highly-political 
cases are almost sure to influence the public’s perception of a 
supposed nonpartisan judiciary—the branch of government tasked 
with the responsibility of being an independent arbiter of the rule of 
law. This perceived politicization has only increased over time. The 
recent confirmation proceedings of Justice Brett Kavanaugh further 
contributed to—and for some, confirmed the existence of—a partisan 
division within the Supreme Court.88 In pointed testimony before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, now-Justice Kavanaugh described the 
sexual assault allegations against him as “a calculated and 
orchestrated political hit, fueled with apparent pent-up anger about 
President Trump and the 2016 election” and “[r]evenge on behalf of 
the Clintons.”89 Justice Kavanaugh’s denunciation of a particular 
political party could reinforce perceptions that the Supreme Court is 
further wavering from its roots as a nonpartisan, unbiased observer, 
particularly during a time when the Court already appears to be 




 88. See Ronald Brownstein, Brett Kavanaugh is Patient Zero, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/kavanaughs-
partisanship-threatens-supreme-court/571702/ [https://perma.cc/WUN7-F3ZR] 
(“That would create a stark equation for Roberts, who must surely realize that much–
perhaps most–of the nation would question the validity of every 5–4 party-line 
decision in which Kavanaugh would provide the deciding vote. In the past, fear of 
further eroding the Court’s legitimacy has provided a limited (though hardly uniform) 
check on Roberts’s willingness to force major decisions on party-line votes. But if the 
Senate confirms Kavanaugh, it will present Roberts with a justice whose every 
decision will be viewed through the lens of the partisan and tribal animosities he 
inflamed to defend his nomination.”). 
 89. Kavanaugh hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-
hearing-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/74MR-9DCC]. 
 90. See Brownstein, supra note 88 (“Kavanaugh’s behavior has irrevocably 
marked his . . . tenure on the Court. With such a partisan route as his pathway, a Justice 
Kavanaugh would arrive at the Supreme Court as a patient zero, carrying a virus of 
illegitimacy to its decisions. Since Kavanaugh declared his hostility to the Democratic 
Party and the left so openly and with such ferocity, it has seemed inevitable that tens 
of millions of Americans will never see him as an impartial judge.”); Tessa Berenson, 
How this Brutal Confirmation Process Could Shape Brett Kavanaugh as a Supreme Court 
Justice, TIME (Oct. 2, 2018), http://time.com/5409739/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-
court-justice-process/ [https://perma.cc/QNM6-PJ2F] (“Blaming Democrats for his 
ordeal could be a sign that Kavanaugh would carry that anger to the high court and 
stay rigidly with the Justices nominated by Republican presidents.”). 
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divisiveness within the judiciary is troubling. As Justice Elena Kagan 
once explained, “The court’s strength as an institution of American 
governance depends on people . . . believing that it is not simply an 
extension of politics, that its decision-making has a kind of integrity to 
it. . . . And if people don’t believe that they have no reason to accept 
what the court does.”91 
As partisan ideologies continue to diverge, even moderate 
judicial involvement in partisan politics will seemingly undermine 
necessary separation of the three branches of government. This is 
because such involvement weakens the judiciary by politicizing it, 
which then collaterally weakens the political branches of government 
when the judiciary interferes. Accordingly, there are lessons to be 
learned from decisions like Bush v. Gore, and the judiciary should 
continue to be cognizant of when judicial restraint in resolving 
political disputes is necessary. 
Nevertheless, simply avoiding cases or controversies with a 
strong political component altogether may abdicate the judiciary’s 
power to serve as a reasonable check on elected government. 
Ultimately, the struggle between the judiciary’s function to serve as a 
check on the other branches of government while also maintaining 
judicial independence and integrity is at the focal point of 
gerrymandering claims. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN REDISTRICTING 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to address political issues, 
accompanied by the consequences that result when the judiciary 
takes on such politically charged issues, helps explain why the judicial 
branch has struggled to face the issue of partisan gerrymandering 
head-on. 
This section addresses the nature of the redistricting process, the 
history of the Supreme Court’s decision-making in gerrymandering 
cases, and how its decision-making has led to the current form of 
partisan gerrymandering seen today. Further, this section takes 
account of the Court’s expressed doubts on crafting a justiciable 
standard on gerrymandering while taking a closer look at the limited 
scope under which a claimant may achieve standing, before ultimately 
 
 91. Mark Sherman & Jessica Gresko, Brett Kavanaugh’s Attack on Democrats 
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raising the question of whether the Court will ever review a partisan 
gerrymandering case on the merits. 
A. Primacy of the Legislature in Redistricting 
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court clarified that the dimensions of a 
state’s electoral districts are unquestionably a political matter in the 
first instance.92 Authority to draw district maps is explicitly given to 
state legislatures by the Constitution.93 Specifically, Article I, Section 
4 of the United States Constitution provides: “The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”94 Consistent with this 
Constitutional provision, Justice Scalia, in Vieth, noted Congress’s 
“initial power to draw districts for federal elections . . . .”95 Further, 
the Court has regularly stated that state legislatures are best equipped 
for the task of redistricting.96 
B. Redistricting as an Important Equal Protection Concern, with 
Practical Impacts 
Despite the reticence to address redistricting in some instances, 
the courts have regularly found themselves acting as a check on the 
legislative branch with respect to redistricting cases and 
controversies. The judiciary’s involvement in redistricting can 
generally be traced back to Baker v. Carr.97 In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that equal protection challenges to state legislature-drawn 
 
 92. 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1977) (“[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a 
matter for legislative consideration and determination . . . .”). 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 94. Id. art I, § 4 (emphasis added). 
 95. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004). 
 96. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997) (“The task of redistricting is 
best left to state legislatures, elected by the people and as capable as the courts, if not 
more so, in balancing the myriad factors and traditions in legitimate districting 
policies.”); see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977) (quoting Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)) (“We have repeatedly emphasized that ‘legislative 
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and 
determination,’ for a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated 
. . . .”). 
 97. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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electoral maps are important and justiciable.98 This fundamental 
principle was further reinforced and expanded in Reynolds v. Sims, in 
which the Court noted that despite the primacy of the legislature in 
redistricting: 
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of 
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on 
that right strike at the heart of representative government. 
And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as 
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.99 
Because even state legislatures must satisfy the “one person, one 
vote” standard of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and federal 
courts—as well as judicial panels around the country—find 
themselves deeply and increasingly involved in the political process 
and controversy of redistricting. Courts have served an important role 
in redistricting, either when the state legislature fails to legislate a 
new redistricting map after the decennial census is completed, or 
when a districting plan potentially violates the United States 
Constitution and undermines the right of suffrage.100 
This line of cases, going back more than fifty years, underscores 
two important points. First, the Court has always struggled with the 
politicized role it may appear to play in redistricting cases.101 Second, 
the Court has found that the “one person, one vote” principle is too 
important to defer if the legislature does not complete timely 
redistricting, or if it acts improperly with respect to drawing district 
lines.102 
 
 98. Id. at 187–88 (“The complaint[] alleg[es] that . . . these plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the 
debasement of their votes . . . .”). 
 99. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (footnote omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 
(2006); Hippert v. Richie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 2012); see also Wise v. 
Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (“Legislative bodies should not leave their 
reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative 
responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it 
impractical for them to do so, it becomes the ‘unwelcome obligation’ of the federal 
court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 101. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens, 548 U.S. at 399; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109 (1986); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533. 
 102. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267; Davis, 478 U.S. at 109; 
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Independent analysis highlights the importance of assessing 
whether redistricting impinges on an individual’s right to vote, 
illustrating the extent to which redistricting controlled by one 
particular political party increases that party’s opportunity to 
maintain or increase seats in future elections. For example, a study 
completed by the Associated Press demonstrated that in the 2016 
election, “gerrymandered” maps gave Republicans a significant 
advantage.103 The study found that Republicans won as many as 
twenty-two more seats in the House of Representatives than would 
be expected “based on the average vote share in congressional 
districts across the country.”104 In states such as Michigan, South 
Dakota, Wisconsin, Florida, and North Carolina, Republican controlled 
legislatures drew district maps that produced more Republican 
representatives than statewide voting percentages would predict.105 
In addition to skewed representation, gerrymandering harms 
democracy by making too many districts noncompetitive. In 2004, 
only six percent of House of Representative seats were decided with 
a vote share in the range of fifty-five to forty-five percent,106 and fewer 
than fifty of the 435 seats were “seriously contested” that year.107 
Both numbers were a distinct drop-off from historical norms.108 One 
consequence of the non-competitive districts is an increase in 
polarization, creating “safe seats in which incumbents have strong 
incentives to reflect the views of their party’s most extreme 
supporters—i.e., those active in primary elections—and little reason 
to reach out to swing voters.”109 
These statistics demonstrate the extent to which the outcomes of 
elections can be affected or even manipulated by drawing legislative 
boundaries to favor a political party’s own interests and the general, 
overall impact of gerrymandering on elections. Thus, the importance 
 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533. 
 103. David A. Lieb, AP Analysis Shows How Gerrymandering Benefited GOP in 2016, 
AP NEWS (June 27, 2017), 
https://www.apnews.com/e3c5cc51faba4b7fb67d8a3f996bdaca 
[https://perma.cc/B8ZP-2LUS]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform, THE NAT’L VOTER (June 2005), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/p04-07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SJW7-4YVC]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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of redistricting outcomes is reinforced by both Supreme Court 
findings regarding the Equal Protection suffrage protections, and 
statistical analyses underscoring the practical impacts of 
“gerrymandered” maps. However, as with any matter, a redistricting 
case must meet certain thresholds before a court will pass judgment 
on it. 
C. Thresholds for Review of Justiciable Redistricting Cases 
1. A party must have standing to contest a redistricting map. 
A plaintiff must have “a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy” in order to bring a redistricting case before a federal 
court.110 This requires a plaintiff to have suffered an injury in “a 
personal and individual way.”111 A person’s right to vote is “individual 
and personal in nature,”112 so, if a voter can show that his or her right 
to vote has been harmed, he or she has standing to sue. 
Historically, the Court has held that plaintiffs can establish 
standing to sue in gerrymandering cases by proving that they live in 
the challenged district. In Baker v. Carr, for example, the Court held 
that the plaintiffs had standing because they claimed the map 
“disfavor[ed] the voters in the counties in which they reside[d].”113 In 
other cases, such as Bandemer and Vieth, the plurality opinions did not 
directly address standing.114 But in those cases, the plaintiffs lived 
within the challenged districts.115 
Conversely, in a 1995 racial gerrymandering case, the Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ objections to a redistricting map because they 
“d[id] not live in the district that [was] the primary focus” of the claim 
and, accordingly, they lacked standing.116 Further, the partisan 
gerrymandering plaintiffs in Gill based their claim entirely on a 
 
 110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
 111. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 112. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1977). 
 113. Baker, 369 U.S. at 208. 
 114. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 
(1986).. 
 115. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272. 
 116. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739, 744–45 (1995) (“Where a plaintiff 
resides in a racially gerrymandered district . . . the plaintiff has been denied equal 
treatment . . . . On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he 
or she does not suffer those special harms . . . .”). 
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statewide injury, which harmed Democrats’ collective representation 
in the state legislature. At the trial, “not a single plaintiff sought to 
prove that he or she lives in a cracked or packed district.”117 
Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ case was “about group 
political interests, not individual legal rights.”118 As discussed later, 
this standing requirement bears directly on whether the judiciary will 
take on a politicized case.119 
2. Established standards for assessing population and racial 
gerrymandering. 
As previously noted, in Baker v. Carr, the Court reasoned that 
“[j]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well 
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine . . . that a 
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action.”120 This was reiterated in Davis v. Bandemer, where the Court 
again noted that Fourteenth Amendment claims were frequently 
brought to the Court and it knew how to address them.121 Similarly, 
other cases deployed specific standards to assess various claims of 
unconstitutional redistricting.122 Accordingly, when standing exists, 
the judiciary has addressed redistricting disputes by accepting one of 
two primary roles (and sometimes both): (1) drawing district maps 
when legislatures fail to do so; or (2) adjudicating disputes over maps 
drawn by political bodies. 
 
 117. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1932 (2018). 
 118. Id. at 1933. 
 119. See infra Section III.C.3. 
 120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis added). 
 121. 478 U.S. 109, 125–27 (1986). 
 122. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden 
is to show . . . that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s 
decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular 
district.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (“[R]edistricting . . . that is so 
bizarre on its face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race,’ demands the 
same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.” 
(quoting Vill. Of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977)); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (“If . . . plaintiffs can establish 
that the population differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve 
equality, the State must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance 
between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.”). 
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a. Court-drawn redistricting maps. 
The first of those two roles, judicial drawing of district maps, 
presents courts with “the unwelcome obligation of performing in the 
legislature’s stead . . . .”123 This role was once unthinkable. For 
example, when the Illinois legislature failed to update its 
congressional districts to reflect population changes in 1946, 
petitioners asked the Supreme Court to do so.124 However, the Court 
considered it out of the question: “Of course no court can affirmatively 
remap the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity 
with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we 
could only declare the existing electoral system invalid.”125 
That began to change following Baker, as it became clear that 
states would still need to hold elections after courts struck down their 
congressional maps but could not proceed with a district plan ruled 
unconstitutional.126 Eventually, in 1965, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the judiciary’s power “to formulate a valid 
redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but 
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically 
encouraged.”127 In the decades since, this practice has become 
common when courts grant relief to plaintiffs who bring claims that 
the map from the prior census no longer serves the “one person, one 
vote” principle following the decennial census, and the legislature has 
either failed to draw a new map or it appears there is insufficient time 
for the legislature to draw such a map prior to the first major election 
after the census results are published.128 Plaintiffs in these cases are 
frequently voters who claim violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the state or federal constitution and 
are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In states like Minnesota—where 
 
 123. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977). 
 124. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 125. Id. at 553. Pre-Baker, the Court held that it could not even declare the system 
invalid because doing so would interfere with Congress’s role. See id. at 556. 
 126. See Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964) 
(holding that Maryland courts should step in “if the legislature fails to enact a 
constitutionally valid state legislative apportionment scheme in a timely fashion . . . 
under no circumstances should the 1966 election . . . be conducted pursuant to the 
existing or any other unconstitutional plan.”); see also Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40, 
41 (1964). 
 127. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965). 
 128. See Sara N. Nordstand, The “Unwelcome Obligation”: Why Neither State Nor 
Federal Courts Should Draw District Lines, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2005 (2018). 
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the state legislature regularly fails to agree upon a new district map 
following the decennial census—the state supreme court consistently 
draws congressional and legislative maps.129 
Despite the Supreme Court’s anxiety over accepting political 
cases and addressing political questions, state and federal courts have 
found ways to establish standards for the drawing of fair maps, and to 
draw maps that do not result in further legal challenge, when called to 
do so. Their approaches are informative to the extent courts feel 
compelled to address redistricting claims, but do not wish to release 
or enable a map that is intentionally—or even accidently—partisan. 
Indeed, Minnesota’s own history provides an illustrative example 
that informs the consideration of partisan gerrymandering standards 
later in this article. The Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
has the authority, under sections 2.724, subdivision 1, and 480.16 of 
the Minnesota Statutes, to appoint a special redistricting panel if the 
state legislature and governor are unable to enact a congressional 
redistricting plan within a statutorily provided timeframe.130 In 2001, 
then-Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz of the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
petitioned to appoint such a panel—the first Minnesota Special 
Redistricting Panel—to oversee all of Minnesota’s 2001–02 
redistricting litigation.131 After the Minnesota legislature failed to 
complete congressional and legislative redistricting activities by the 
statutory deadline, the redistricting panel of five judges addressed the 
constitutionality of Minnesota’s congressional election districts and 
adopted a redistricting plan that was considered “fundamentally fair 
 
 129. See Hippert v. Richie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 2012) (“The ordinary 
remedy for this constitutional defect is for the Minnesota Legislature to redraw the 
state’s senate and house districts to better reflect the state’s population. . . . [The] 
statutory deadline has arrived, and the Legislature and Governor have not enacted a 
legislative redistricting plan. Therefore, it is the role of the state judicial branch to 
prepare a valid legislative plan and order its adoption.”) (citation omitted). 
 130. MINN. STAT. §§ 2.724, subdiv. 1, 480.16; see also Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 379 
(“Traditional redistricting is performed through the legislative process, and the 
redistricting plan is enacted into law only after it is passed by the Legislature and 
signed by the Governor.”); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, 629 N.W.2d 98, 98 (Minn. 2001) 
(ordering “that the special redistricting panel shall release a redistricting plan . . . only 
in the event a legislative redistricting plan is not enacted in a timely manner.”). 
 131. Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, C0-01-160, at 1 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel 
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and based primarily on the state’s population and secondarily on 
neutral districting principles.”132 
With respect to population, the parties stipulated that “[t]he 
districts must be as nearly equal in population as is practicable. 
Because a court-ordered redistricting plan must conform to a higher 
standard of population equality than a legislative redistricting plan, 
absolute population equality will be the goal.”133 The neutral 
redistricting principles, which were also stipulated to by the parties, 
helped guide the redistricting panel in compiling a redistricting plan 
that satisfied both constitutional and statutory requirements.134 
Further, these politically neutral redistricting principles were meant 
to “advance the interests of the collective public good and preserve 
the public’s confidence and perception of fairness in the redistricting 
process.”135 The redistricting principles considered by the panel 
included the following: 
 Contiguity and Compactness: “Districts will consist of 
convenient, contiguous territory structured into compact 
units. . . . Districts with areas that connect at only a single 
point will be considered noncontiguous.”136 
 
 132. Id. at 4. For access to all orders and other documents related to the 2001 
Special Redistricting Panel visit http://www.mncourts.gov/Media/Historic-High-
Profile-Cases/Special-Redistricting-Panel-2001.aspx [https://perma.cc/MY7X-
LB4C]. 
 133. Id. at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (Order Stating 
Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions) (internal citation 
omitted), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Criteria_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG42-G6U6]. 
 134. Id. at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel July 12, 2001) (Chief Justice Blatz’s 
Redistricting Order), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Blatz_JulyOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5PX-JFWZ]; Zachman, C0-01-160 (Minn. 
Special Redistricting Panel Mar. 19, 2002) (Final Order Adopting a Congressional 
Redistricting Plan), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/CIOMediaLibrary/2001Redistricti
ng/Final_Congressional_Order.PDF [https://perma.cc/4F7L-B2SM]. 
 135. Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel 
Feb. 21, 2012). 
 136. Zachman, C0-01-160, at 2 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) 
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions). 
“Contiguity” has been explained as “[a]ll parts of a district being connected at some 
point with the rest of the district,” whereas “compactness” has been described as 
“[h]aving the minimum distance between all the parts of a constituency (a circle, 
square or a hexagon is the most compact district).” Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L 
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 Preserve Communities of Interest: “Communities of 
interest will be preserved where possible . . . . For 
purposes of this principle, ‘communities of interest’ 
include, but are not limited to, groups of Minnesota 
citizens with clearly recognizable similarities of social, 
geographic, political, cultural, ethnic, economic, or other 
interests.”137 
 Preserve counties and other political subdivisions: “The 
districts will be drawn with attention to county, city, and 
township boundaries. A county, city, or township will not 
be divided into more than one district except as 
necessary to meet equal population requirements or to 
form districts that are composed of convenience, 
contiguous, and compact territory. When any county, 
city, or township must be divided into one or more 
districts, it will be divided into as few districts as 
possible.”138 
 Not Drawn for Purpose of Defeating Incumbents: “Districts 
may not be drawn for the purpose of protecting or 
defeating an incumbent. However, as a factor 
subordinate to all redistricting criteria, the panel may 
view a proposed plan’s effect on incumbents to 
determine whether the plan results in either undue 
incumbent protection or excessive incumbent 
conflicts.”139 
Similarly, in 2012, a Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel of five 
judges (“2012 Panel”) drew a new state congressional and legislative 
district map following the 2010 U.S. Census, when the legislature 
again failed to do so by an established deadline.140 The criteria used 
was much the same as the criteria used by the 2001 Minnesota Special 
Redistricting Panel, but with an additional specified criterion 
addressing the preservation of political subdivisions: “[p]olitical 
subdivisions shall not be divided more than necessary to meet 
 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3BU6-Q5HN]. 
 137. Zachman, C0-01-160, at 3 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Dec. 11, 2001) 
(Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan Submissions). 
 138. Id. at 2–3. 
 139. Id. at 3. 
 140. Hippert v. Ritchie, 813 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 2012) (Final Order Adopting a 
Congressional Redistricting Plan). 
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constitutional requirements.”141 With respect to its use of neutral 
redistricting criteria, the panel explained that these principles are 
necessary because “[w]hen the judicial branch performs redistricting, 
it lacks the political authority of the legislative and executive branches 
and, therefore, must act in a restrained and deliberative manner to 
accomplish the task.”142 Consistent with the panel’s recognition that 
courts engaged in redistricting lack the political authority possessed 
by the legislature and governor, “the plan established by the panel 
[was] a least-change plan to the extent feasible.”143 Because the prior 
map was considered essentially nonpartisan, the 2012 Panel felt it 
unnecessary to draw a new map from scratch, instead making 
minimal adjustments to the existing congressional district 
boundaries.144 
The 2012 Panel issued its revised map on February 21, 2012, and 
the Minneapolis Star Tribune editorial board said its impression of the 
map was “largely positive.”145 Others were not as supportive of the 
revised map, however. For instance, then-Congressional 
Representative Michele Bachmann wrote the following to supporters: 
“Just as we suspected, the liberal courts have changed the makeup of 
Minnesota’s Congressional districts. The courts’ liberal bias was 
evident by cherry-picking the districts and going so far as to draw my 
 
 141. Hippert v. Ritchie, A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov. 4, 2011) 




 142. Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 395 (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, (1977) 
(stating that courts lack the “political authoritativeness” that legislatures bring to 
redistricting and that a court’s task “is inevitably an exposed and sensitive one that 
must be accomplished circumspectly, and in a manner free from any taint of 
arbitrariness or discrimination”)); see Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 393 (2012) (per 
curiam) (stating that “redistricting ordinarily involves criteria and standards that 
have been weighed and evaluated by the elected branches in the exercise of their 
political judgment” and that courts are “ill suited” to make such policy judgments). 
 143. Hippert, 813 N.W.2d at 397. 
 144. Id. at 398. 
 145. Editorial, Credit Judges for Fair Representation, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.startribune.com/editorial-credit-judges-for-fair-
representation/139913633/ [https://perma.cc/Y6MB-Z4WK]; see Chris Steller, 
Redistricting Draws Reformers but Some Say Process Worked Fine Last Time, TWIN 
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home . . . outside the new sixth district.”146 However, neither the 2002 
nor 2012 redistricting maps presented by the Minnesota Special 
Redistricting Panels drew appeals, and overall reviews of the map 
were largely positive.147 Further, the focus on neutral redistricting 
criteria, while using political considerations solely as a check to 
ensure the new map did not lean too far in either direction, appears 
to have helped public perception of the 2012 Panel’s final decision.148 
As another example, in January 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court found the state’s Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011 
unconstitutional due to extreme partisan gerrymander, and enjoined 
its use in upcoming May 2018 primary elections.149 To remedy the 
situation, the court directed that, should the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly choose to submit a congressional district plan that satisfies 
the requirements of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and should such 
plan be accepted by the governor, it must then be submitted to the 
court for review.150 The court also offered the opportunity for parties 
and intervenors to submit proposed remedial districting plans to the 
court for consideration.151 The court specified that any remedial 
congressional districting plan, whether submitted by parties or 
intervenors or enacted by the legislature and governor, must consist 
of “congressional districts composed of compact and contiguous 
territory; as nearly equal in population as practicable; and which do 
not divide any county, city, incorporated town, borough, township, or 
ward, except where necessary to ensure equality of population.”152 
Ultimately, the General Assembly was unable to pass legislation 
for the governor’s approval, making it the judiciary’s responsibility to 
create an appropriate redistricting plan.153 The court considered 
 
 146. Brian Lambert, Bachmann Not Pleased With ‘Liberal Courts’ on Redistricting, 
MINNPOST (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com/glean/2012/02/bachmann-
not-pleased-liberal-courts-redistricting [https://perma.cc/A4NX-3JWU]. 
 147. Credit Judges for Fair Representation, supra note 145. 
 148. Credit Judges for Fair Representation, supra note 145 (praising the “even-
handedness of the five-judge panel’s work, befitting their mixed political pedigrees”). 
 149. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) 
(per curiam), cert. denied sub nom; see Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018). 
 150. League of Women Voters, 175 A.3d at 284. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2018). The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that this was within its constitutional authority 
and responsibility, as under Pennsylvania law, “[w]hen the legislature is unable or 
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proposed remedial districting plans submitted by other parties, 
intervenors, and amici, and chose a plan that was “composed of 
congressional districts which follow the traditional redistricting 
criteria of compactness, contiguity, equality of population, and 
respect for the integrity of political subdivisions.”154 The court itself 
redrew the state’s congressional district lines and issued a remedial 
congressional map.155 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s action drew both criticism 
and praise. Election experts said the Pennsylvania map “appear[ed] to 
be tilted toward neither political party,” and that it “look[ed] more like 
a 9-to-9 division of the state.”156 However, some politicians were not 
all so pleased. A state senator complained: “Implementation of this 
map would create a constitutional crisis where the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is usurping the authority of the legislative and 
executive branches. . . . This map illustrates that the definition of fair 
is simply code for a desire to elect more Democrats.”157 Pennsylvania 
Governor Tom Wolf, on the other hand, “applaud[ed] the court for 
their decision and respect[ed] their effort to remedy Pennsylvania’s 
unfair and unequal congressional elections.”158 
There is no doubt that courts addressing redistricting maps have 
drawn criticism from both sides of the aisle, given that this is “one of 
the most intense inter-branch conflicts that our constitutional system 
allows. . . . [T]he affected parties will analyze each decision a court 
makes for any hint of bias . . . .”159 As such, it is nearly impossible for 
any redistricting map to avoid all criticism.160 Likewise, it is possible 
for judicially-constructed maps to be unfair or overly partisan, just as 
 
chooses not to act, it becomes the judiciary’s role to ensure a valid districting scheme.” 
Id. at 1122 n.6. 
 154. Id. at 1087. 
 155. Id. at 1087–89. 
 156. Trip Gabriel & Jess Bidgood, Court-Drawn Map in Pennsylvania May Lift 
Democrats’ House Chances, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/us/pennsylvania-map.html 
[https://perma.cc/2TVA-GJ7K]. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn 
Redistricting Plans, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 16 (2005), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/74/ 
[https://perma.cc/EUW7-AGKC]. 
 160. Id. at 17 (“No redistricting plan—and certainly no court plan under exigent 
circumstances—is perfect.”). 
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it is possible for maps drawn by a state legislature to cross party lines 
or to be partisan but reasonably fair. The above examples indicate, 
however, that it may be possible for courts to draw redistricting maps 
that do not broadly undermine faith in the judiciary, even while 
acknowledging such maps always draw some critics. 
b. Judicial review of legislature-drawn maps 
The judiciary’s other possible role in redistricting gets more 
attention: adjudication of disputes over legislature-drawn district 
maps.161 Ever since Baker, courts have debated what role they can and 
should have as referees in this fight, and what standards they should 
use to judge a district map. However, the Court has not hesitated to 
assess and strike down district maps that it finds are racial 
gerrymanders.162 
Unequal population claims—that is, claims that redrawn districts 
do not fairly represent the population distribution—were the original 
bases for gerrymandering lawsuits.163 In 1964, the Supreme Court 
held that a state legislature must be apportioned according to 
population.164 The Court required of state legislatures “an honest and 
good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, 
as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”165 This requirement 
was rooted in the principle that “[l]egislators represent people, not 
trees or acres.”166 
Additionally, it is well-settled that the Equal Protection Clause 
“prohibits a State, without sufficient justification, from separat[ing] its 
 
 161. See Redistricting and the Supreme Court: The Most Significant Cases, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jul. 19, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-and-the-supreme-court-
the-most-significant-cases.aspx [https://perma.cc/9R9D-D6SC] (discussing 
prominent cases the Supreme Court has handled concerning adjudication of 
legislatively-drawn districts).   
 162. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 
(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 163. See generally David Stebenne, Re-Mapping American Politics: The 
Redistricting Revolution Fifty Years Later, ORIGINS (Feb. 2012), 
http://origins.osu.edu/article/re-mapping-american-politics-redistricting-
revolution-fifty-years-later [https://perma.cc/K7BP-PAKT] (discussing the origin 
and history of “gerrymandering”). 
 164. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 165. Id. at 577. 
 166. Id. at 562. 
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citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.”167 
Congressional districts drawn on the basis of race violate the 
Constitution when: (1) ”race was the predominant factor motivating 
the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters 
within or without a particular district,”168 and (2) that racial 
motivation fails to pass the court’s “strict scrutiny.”169 To meet strict 
scrutiny, a state must prove that its district map is “narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling governmental interest.”170 
The 2017 Supreme Court decision in Cooper v. Harris highlights 
the emphasis placed on racial gerrymandering cases and the 
applicable standard of review.171 In Cooper, the Court held that two 
North Carolina congressional districts were unconstitutional racial 
gerrymanders.172 The Court found that the state had purposefully 
aimed to make those districts majority-black, “packing” African-
American voters into the two districts and limiting their influence in 
the surrounding districts.173 The state admitted that race was its 
primary motivating factor in one of the districts, but argued that it was 
simply attempting to comply with the Voting Rights Act.174 The Court 
rejected this argument, noting that the preferred candidate of African-
American voters had already consistently won that district under 
previous electoral maps.175 The “packing,” therefore, was 
unnecessary to give fair voice to African-American voters, and the 
race-based gerrymandering failed strict scrutiny.176 
In Cooper, the parties further argued that it was difficult to 
separate racial motivation from partisan motivation in the drawing of 
district maps because past voting data indicated a correlation 
between voting preference and race.177 Indeed, the North Carolina 
legislature in Cooper attempted to argue that it was merely attempting 
to “pack” Democrats into the second challenged district, not African-
 
 167. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 168. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 169. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993). 
 170. Id. at 631. 
 171. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
 172. Id. at 1481–82. 
 173. Id. at 1468. 
 174. Id. at 1469–70. 
 175. Id. at 1470–71. 
 176. Id. at 1469–70. 
 177. Id. at 1473. 
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Americans.178 While determining whether race or political affiliation 
motivated the line-drawing is largely a factual question, the Court 
explained that alleged racial gerrymandering is subject to closer 
scrutiny because it “threatens special harms” that are not found in 
political gerrymandering cases.179 Racial gerrymandering reinforces 
racial stereotypes and tacitly tells elected officials that they represent 
a racial group rather than their full constituency.180 Therefore, racial 
gerrymandering is not “functionally equivalent” to political 
gerrymandering and is not “subject to precisely the same 
constitutional scrutiny.”181 Because political gerrymandering does 
not threaten the same harms, the Court treats it differently from racial 
gerrymandering. 
This background illustrates the Court’s method of assessing 
population and racial gerrymandering claims. However, partisan 
gerrymandering presents unique challenges, not only in terms of 
importance, but also in setting a workable standing threshold and 
standard of review. 
3. Partisan gerrymandering cases present unique challenges 
Davis v. Bandemer marked the Supreme Court’s first attempt to 
consider a political gerrymandering claim—almost twenty years after 
Baker v. Carr.182 The plaintiffs in Bandemer argued that Indiana’s 
district lines “were intended to and did violate their right, as 
Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”183 A majority of the Court held the claim was justiciable 
and that the standards for political gerrymandering cases were just as 
judicially manageable as those for racial gerrymandering cases.184 
However, according to the Bandemer plurality, the plaintiffs needed 
“to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable 
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”185 
In a separate opinion, Justice Powell argued that the plurality’s 
standard was not clear and that the Court had “fail[ed] to enunciate 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649–50 (1993). 
 180. Id. at 650. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 115 (1986), with Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 189 (1962). 
 183. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115. 
 184. Id. at 125. 
 185. Id. at 127. 
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standards by which to determine whether a legislature has enacted an 
unconstitutional gerrymander.”186 Justice Powell’s opinion has 
proven prescient: As of the writing of this article, no Supreme Court 
majority has ever agreed upon a standard for unconstitutional 
political gerrymandering, and the Court has never held that a district 
map constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander. The 
Supreme Court did not revisit the Bandemer decision for eighteen 
years. In the interim, the lower courts were left with the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s inability to furnish a standard for addressing 
claims of political gerrymandering.187 And the lower courts, having 
considered numerous political gerrymandering claims, did not 
themselves succeed in shaping a standard for determining these 
claims.188 
Subsequently, in 2004, a plurality of Supreme Court justices 
concluded that Bandemer should be revisited and partisan 
gerrymandering cases should be declared non-justiciable.189 In Vieth, 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion acknowledged “the incompatibility of 
severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic principles.”190 Even 
so, Scalia’s opinion surveyed the courts’ attempts to agree on a 
partisan gerrymandering standard and concluded that because none 
had emerged, none must exist.191 Thus, a plurality of the Court found 
in Vieth that “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking 
them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable . . . .”192 
 
 186. Id. at 161–62. 
 187. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004). 
 188. Id. at 279–80. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Vieth, discussed the 
history of the lower courts’ political gerrymandering decisions in the eighteen year 
span between Bandemer and Vieth: 
Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18 years, succeeded in 
shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate. 
They have simply applied the standard set forth in Bandemer’s four-
Justice plurality opinion. This might be thought to prove that the four-
Justice plurality standard has met the test of time—but for the fact that its 
application has almost invariably produced the same result (except for 
the incurring of attorney’s fees) as would have obtained if the question 
were nonjusticiable: Judicial intervention has been refused. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 189. Id. at 281. 
 190. Id. at 292. 
 191. Id. at 281. 
 192. Id. 
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The plaintiffs and dissenters in Vieth argued that standards for 
political gerrymandering are “manageable” because they can be 
borrowed from cases determining that racial gerrymandering is 
unconstitutional.193 Nevertheless, the plurality argued that the effects 
of political gerrymandering, as opposed to racial gerrymandering, are 
impossible to assess, and that creating a standard for evaluating the 
effects of political gerrymandering is near impossible.194 The plurality 
also specifically rejected “fairness” as a standard, finding it judicially 
unmanageable: “Fairness is compatible with noncontiguous districts, 
it is compatible with districts that straddle political subdivisions, and 
it is compatible with a party’s not winning the number of seats that 
mirrors the proportion of its vote.”195 As such, partisan 
gerrymandering is not the same as more “manageable” types of 
gerrymandering claims. 
Despite this discussion, in and after Vieth, the Court has 
continued to recognize that “[p]artisan gerrymanders . . . are 
incompatible with democratic principles.”196 Given the Court’s own 
past statements about the importance of congressional district 
development to fair representation, the question arises: is it really 
acceptable for justices on the country’s highest court to consider it 
impossible to identify and remedy gerrymandering—an 
acknowledged potential harm to democratic principles and the right 
of suffrage? At what point, if any, should American voters accept that 
the judiciary may “call it quits” on identifying a workable standard 
simply because it has not yet been achieved? In doing so, is the Court 
abdicating its role as a check on the legislative branch of government? 
And would an imperfect standard better preserve fair representation 
than no standard at all? 
 
 193. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State 
Bd. Of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 194. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287 (“But a person’s politics is rarely as readily 
discernible—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race. Political 
affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one election to the 
next; and even within a given election, not all voters follow the party line. We dare 
say (and hope) that the political party which puts forward an utterly incompetent 
candidate will lose even in its registration stronghold. These facts make it impossible 
to assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering, to fashion a standard for evaluating 
a violation, and finally to craft a remedy.”) (emphasis in original). 
 195. Id. at 291. 
 196. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2658 (2015) (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292). 
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These questions are particularly vexing considering that the 
Supreme Court has historically been willing to address other 
nebulous problems arguably less important to the underpinnings of 
representative government—including whether art is an obscenity 
not protected by the First Amendment,197 or whether tomatoes 
should legally be considered vegetables.198 One must question 
whether the Court ought to abdicate its responsibility “to say what the 
law is” in cases or controversies that pose a threat to fundamental 
democratic principles.199 
Perhaps for these reasons, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth did not 
garner a majority, and Justice Kennedy refused to wholly shut the 
door on political gerrymandering claims. In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy argued that the fact that “no such standard has 
emerged in this case should not be taken to prove that none will 
emerge in the future. Where important rights are involved, the 
impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side 
of caution.”200 Vieth left the issue unsettled; no Supreme Court 
majority had yet declared political gerrymandering non-justiciable, 
but neither had any majority figured out what to do about it.201 
While other partisan gerrymandering cases have been brought 
to, and reviewed by, the Court, the Court has to date declined to 
further define a standard for justiciability or standard of review. In 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, the Court declined 
to revisit the justiciability issue, instead holding that the plaintiffs had 
not offered the Court a “manageable, reliable measure of fairness for 
determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the 
Constitution.”202 However, the Court did acknowledge that the 
Constitution, through the First and Fourteenth Amendments, limits a 
state’s power to “rely exclusively on partisan preferences in drawing 
 
 197. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964) (Brennan, J., writing 
for the majority) (retaining the “not perfect” and “contemporary community 
standards” test for identifying obscenity); id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Court was “trying to define what may be indefinable . . . But I know it when I 
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
 198. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893). 
 199. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803). 
 200. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 201. See generally id. at 279 (discussing the inability of courts to settle on a 
standard for judicial action). 
 202. 548 U.S. 399, 414 (2006). 
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district lines . . . .”203 Rather, the state has a “fundamental duty . . . to 
govern impartially.”204 
In the twelve years since Perry, political gerrymandering has 
become one of America’s most heated political issues. In 2018, the 
Supreme Court heard two partisan redistricting cases, raising 
expectations that it would finally settle, or at least shed more light on, 
the issue. But in both cases, the Court declined to address the 
justiciability of political gerrymandering cases. In Whitford v. Gill, the 
plaintiffs were Wisconsin voters who argued that the state’s 
legislative map caused “statewide harm to their interest ‘in their 
collective representation in the legislature,’ and in influencing the 
legislature’s overall ‘composition and policymaking.’”205 Additionally, 
the plaintiffs presented a measure of partisan advantage: efficiency 
gaps.206 
[O]n a statewide level, the degree to which packing and 
cracking has favored one party over another can be 
measured by a single calculation: an “efficiency gap” that 
compares each party’s respective “wasted” votes across all 
legislative districts. “Wasted” votes are those cast for a 
losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what 
that candidate needs to win.207 
The Gill plaintiffs promised the Court that the problem of political 
gerrymandering could be solved by evaluating the efficiency gap.208 
The Supreme Court did not agree, determining that the suggested 
efficiency gap metrics do not “address the effect that a gerrymander 
has on the votes of particular citizens.”209 The Court held that voters 
must allege that the impact of their specific, individual vote—not the 
votes of a group—was diluted by a district map. The Gill plaintiffs’ 
claim, however, did not identify “an individual and personal injury of 
the kind required for Article III standing.”210 As such, the Court 
 
 203. Id. at 461. 
 204. Id. at 462. 
 205. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 31). 
 206. Id. at 1924. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1933 (“The plaintiffs and their amici curiae promise us that the 
efficiency gap and similar measures of partisan asymmetry will allow the federal 
courts—armed with just ‘a pencil and paper or a hand calculator’—to finally solve the 
problem of partisan gerrymandering that has confounded the Court for decades.” 
(quoting Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae at 27 (citations omitted))). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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effectively rejected the claims on standing grounds.211 Ultimately, the 
Court did not address whether the map itself was in violation of 
constitutional principles.212 
In Benisek v. Lamone—the Court’s second partisan 
gerrymandering case of 2018—a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim was 
upheld by the Court because the plaintiffs unnecessarily waited six 
years after an election to challenge the legislative map.213 As such, the 
Court again avoided the justiciability questions by instead requiring 
plaintiffs to show “individual and personal injury” to the right to vote 
in order for the Court to consider judicial intervention.214 
It is not surprising that the Court would decide these cases on 
procedural grounds where such issues existed, and avoid wading into 
the “political thicket”215 of judging political maps unless and until 
strictly necessary. This is consistent with long-standing principles of 
eschewing political questions and ensuring standing exists, so as to 
avoid involving the Court in matters that are not ripe or do not present 
 
 211. Arguably, however, the Court rejected the claims by looking past standing to 
the substantive question of whether plaintiffs had established an actual injury rather 
than by questioning simply whether a basis to claim one existed and was caused by 
the redistricting map in question. Id. at 1930–31 (“Here, the plaintiffs’ partisan 
gerrymandering claims turn on allegations that their votes have been diluted. That 
harm arises from the particular composition of the voter’s own district, which causes 
his vote—having been packed or cracked—to carry less weight than it would carry in 
another, hypothetical district.”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944 (2018) (“In considering the balance 
of equities among the parties, we think that plaintiffs’ unnecessary, years-long delay 
in asking for preliminary injunctive relief weighed against their request.”). 
 214. Whitford v. Gill, 138 S. Ct., 1916, 1931 (2018) (“[O]ur cases to date have not 
found that this presents an individual and personal injury of the kind required for 
Article III standing.”). 
 215. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., writing for the 
plurality). While the majority of the Court dismissed the claim of unfair districts, 
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion was delivered only on behalf of three members of a four-
member majority of the Court (since the Court was missing two members). Justice 
Frankfurter wrote for the plurality that “To sustain this action would cut very deep 
into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The 
remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion 
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.” Id. The case was no longer 
considered particularly good law after Baker v. Carr, but the “political thicket” 
language remains commonplace in redistricting discussions. 
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a specific injury.216 Gill sets the bar quite high—if not impossibly 
high—for judicial intervention in redistricting cases, requiring parties 
to establish standing by showing an individualized, personal injury, 
rather than a generalized injury to statewide voters or the collective 
political interest of a larger political party. This approach also helps 
the judiciary avoid criticism for taking either political party’s side in 
an inherently political process. 
Long-standing Supreme Court precedent nonetheless suggests 
that the judiciary must remain open to addressing gerrymandering 
cases due to the practical impacts of redistricting on voting rights and 
the Court’s recognition of the importance of voting in our 
representative democracy. Moreover, judicial consideration may be 
the most effective course of addressing partisan gerrymandering 
cases in a non-partisan manner because judicial review is intended to 
be non-partisan (at least at the federal level, where judges are 
appointed). Finally, if the judiciary continues to avoid cases of 
partisan gerrymandering on justiciability grounds, despite the 
findings of Davis v. Bandemer, state legislatures may feel increasingly 
empowered to draw unfairly partisan maps without any fear of 
restriction.217 
In light of the legal importance of the right to suffrage, the 
practical and statistical impact of political redistricting on the voting 
outcomes, and the potential consequences of abdicating judicial 
oversight of redistricting, the Court should not extract the judiciary 
from partisan redistricting entirely. That is, the Court should not issue 
any conclusions that extend the plurality opinion in Vieth.218 
 
 216. See, e.g., Abbot Laboratories v. Gardener, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (analyzing the 
ripeness doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (analyzing the political 
question doctrine). 
 217. See Robert Pack, Land Grab: The Pros and Cons of Congressional Redistricting, 
D.C. BAR (Apr. 2004), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-
resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/april-2004-redistricting.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/WMK5-USWX] (“Any person or party seeking to have a new map 
thrown out for political reasons faces an uphill battle. ‘Each year that passes and no 
plan is ever found to violate that doctrine,’ says Klain, ‘the more the legislatures feel 
themselves unencumbered [by the courts].’”). 
 218. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on two new partisan 
gerrymandering cases on March 26, 2019. The first case, Lamone v. Benisek, was 
originally considered by the Court during the 2017–18 term and resulted in a brief, 
unsigned opinion that left the merits unaddressed. Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. ___ 
(2018). The case then went back to the district court. The district court ruled for the 
plaintiffs and ordered the Maryland to draw a new map for the 2020 election. No. 
1:13-CV-03233-JKB, 2018 WL 5816831, cert. granted (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2018). The 
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That said, we are mindful of the limited role of the judiciary, the 
importance of the political question doctrine, and of cases in which 
the Court has issued perceivably “partisan” decisions in highly 
politicized cases.219 As a result, courts should continue to be careful 
and methodical in determining when to address partisan 
gerrymandering cases. To balance these concerns, courts should only 
assume the important responsibility of finding partisan 
gerrymandering claims justiciable under carefully-assessed 
circumstances, and they should approach such matters 
acknowledging directly how the case outcomes may be perceived. 
IV. TOWARD A STANDARD FOR ASSESSING UNDUE POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
IN REDISTRICTING 
As delineated throughout this article, the question remains: how 
should the judiciary approach political redistricting in a manner that 
is fair, mindful of political outcomes, and maintains public faith in the 
judiciary? This requires workable standards that address two issues. 
First, what is the appropriate standard for determining when a party 
has standing to raise a gerrymandering claim—that is, what are the 
boundaries of judicial consideration for a partisan gerrymandering 
case? Second, what is the appropriate substantive standard to apply 
to partisan gerrymandering claims? 
A. Legislative Solutions: Nonpartisan Redistricting Commissions 
Currently, nine states give “primary responsibility” for drawing 
congressional district plans to nonpartisan redistricting 
commissions: Arizona, Colorado, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Michigan, New Jersey, and Washington.220 Although such practices 
 
second case, Rucho v. Common Cause, also considers whether partisan 
gerrymandering claims are justiciable and whether a congressional map, in this 
instance North Carolina’s, is unconstitutional. No. 1:16-CV-1026, 2018 WL 4214334, 
cert. granted (M.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 2018). Both cases provide the Court opportunities to 
reconsider the plurality opinion in Vieth. 
 219. See supra Section II. 
 220. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commissions: 
Congressional Plans (Jan. 21, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions-
congressional-plans.aspx [https://perma.cc/7DE6-4T7E] [hereinafter Redistricting 
Commissions: Congressional Plans]. 
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have been challenged, 221 the Supreme Court has held that the 
Elections Clause permits ballot initiatives to move district line-
drawing power from a state’s legislature to an independent 
commission.222 Other states utilize a commission on an advisory 
basis, with primary responsibility remaining in the hands of the 
legislature.223 Still others have explored, or are exploring, the 
utilization of commissions in some regard.224 One potential advantage 
of utilizing multi-partisan or nonpartisan commissions is that fewer 
redistricting maps drawn by them lead to partisan gerrymandering 
challenges before the courts. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that these commissions are 
already accomplishing important goals of districting reform. One such 
goal is more competitive districts.225 For example, Arizona’s 
Independent Redistricting Commission was created by ballot 
initiative in 2000 and produced maps in 2001 and 2011. Those maps 
had an average margin of candidate victory more than twenty-eight 
percent lower than the rest of the nation.226 California followed in 
2010 by creating the Citizen’s Redistricting Commission. After 
creating the independent commission, California saw the number of 
“toss-up” districts—those decided by five percentage points or 
fewer—increase sharply, and its average margin of victory dropped 
thirty percent from the previous decade.227 Put differently, the 
districts drawn by these commissions have less partisan tilt in one 
direction or the other. 
 
 221. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 
(2015). 
 222. Id. at 2673 (“Nothing in that Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held, 
that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of 
holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”). 
 223. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 220. 
 224. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Redistricting Commission Bills 
(Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-
commission-bills.aspx [https://perma.cc/T45K-2NP7]. 
 225. Kim Soffen, Independently Drawn Districts Have Proved to Be More 
Competitive, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/upshot/independently-drawn-districts-
have-proved-to-be-more-competitive.html [https://perma.cc/QE55-YST6]. But see 
Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United 
States, 3 U.C-IRVINE L. REV. 637, 666–67 (expressing skepticism that increased 
competitiveness can be fully explained by independent commissions). 
 226. Soffen, supra note 226. 
 227. Soffen, supra note 226. 
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The commissions also have increased transparency and 
openness, as they have held “a considerable number of hearings to 
solicit input from the public.”228 Yet another virtue of the 
commissions: they produce district maps on time and those maps go 
unchallenged by costly and time-consuming litigation.229 This is in 
contrast to legislatures, which frequently find themselves 
deadlocked.230 
Different commissions achieve these goals in different ways. The 
commissions in Arizona and California, for example, took divergent 
approaches to member selection.231 Most importantly, they differed 
sharply in their approach to drawing district maps.232 However, both 
had “clear, prioritized criteria” which guided the map-drawers, 
insulating them from political bias. The “differences ultimately seem 
to have been less important to the success of the commission than the 
fact that there were clear and . . . prioritized rules.”233 The Arizona 
commission is tasked with creating the most competitive districts that 
it can. Arizona’s constitution states that “[t]o the extent practicable, 
competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create 
no significant detriment to the other goals.”234 To promote 
competition, the Arizona commission takes partisan data into 
consideration.235 In contrast, the California commission is forbidden 
from considering partisan data,236 and is required by its constitution 
to respect “[t]he geographic integrity of any city, county, city and 
 
 228. Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 666. 
 229. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 651 (“As yet, a court has not stepped 
into the process to draw maps when a commission is responsible for creating 
congressional maps. Commissions consistently deliver district maps on time, and 
largely without litigation.”). 
 230. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 651. 
 231. See Miller & Grofman, supra note 226, at 666. 
 232. Soffen, supra note 226. 
 233. Redistricting Commissions: What Works, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jul. 24, 
2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/redistricting-commissions-what-
works [https://perma.cc/LC4K-KYJT]; see Campaign Legal Center, Designing 
Independent Redistricting Commissions (2018), 
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-
07/Designing_IRC_Report2_FINAL_Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8W4-LWV3]. 
 234. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F). 
 235. Soffen, supra note 226. (“In California, the commission was legally forbidden 
from considering partisan data when forming the districts, as opposed to Arizona, 
where the commission was supposed to use this data to promote competition.”). 
 236. Soffen, supra note 226. 
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county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest . . . .”237 
This means “keeping the rural areas in the same district or putting the 
Northern California wineries in the same district as their 
warehouses.”238 
In other words, as the National Conference of State Legislatures 
has stated, much depends on the make-up of each commission and the 
scope of its assigned work.239 There is some evidence that 
independent redistricting commissions achieve several important 
redistricting goals that partisan legislatures struggle with. California 
and Arizona present two different examples of how settled, 
prioritized criteria can guide map-drawers in creating more 
competitive district races. 
Though it is not a complete solution, these practices have the 
benefit of helping to ensure more redistricting plans are completed 
outside of the legislature and with fewer abdication of map-drawing 
or appeals to the courts. Other states were investigating such 
initiatives as of this article’s drafting, and by the time of publication it 
is possible other states’ voters will have approved new redistricting 
commissions.240 Such practices, if permitted to expand to other states, 
have the potential to help more courts avoid wading into the “political 
thicket” of either drawing or reviewing redistricting maps. 
B. Judicial Solutions: Appropriate Standards and Steps in the Political 
Thicket 
1. Establishing standards for evaluating partisan 
gerrymandering claims 
Although the redistricting commission is a promising construct 
to insulate the judiciary—among other goals—it is only available 
where new legislation or a ballot initiative approves its creation. 
Given the primacy of the legislature, it appears that implementation 
 
 237. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). 
 238. Soffen, supra note 226. 
 239. Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 220(“Reformers 
often mistakenly assume that commissions will be less partisan than legislatures 
when conducting redistricting but that depends largely on the design of the board or 
commission.”). 
 240. Alexis Farmer & Annie Lo, Citizen and Legislative Efforts to Reform 
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of a redistricting commission cannot be required by judicial order. As 
such, the existence of commissions in some states does not resolve the 
question of when and on what grounds courts should assess and 
decide questions of partisan gerrymandering. 
a. Standing should not be an insurmountable barrier to 
justiciability 
First, it is critical to address the standing threshold, as standing 
confers jurisdiction. Narrow interpretations of what constitutes 
standing can significantly reduce the number of occasions when an 
Article III court hears a partisan gerrymandering case. By way of 
review, a threshold for consideration of political redistricting claims 
is whether the plaintiff has standing to state a claim. To show standing 
before an Article III court in a redistricting case, a plaintiff must have 
“a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” requiring an 
individualized injury to the person’s right to vote.241 
This standing requirement in partisan gerrymandering cases was 
upheld and further defined in Gill v. Whitford, largely by requiring that 
a voter challenging a redistricting plan on partisan gerrymandering 
grounds live in a district in which votes were “packed” or “cracked.”242 
In Gill, the lead plaintiff acknowledged that his ability to elect a 
representative from his political party of choice would have likely 
been essentially the same regardless of statewide partisan 
gerrymandering. Other plaintiffs focused on statewide (rather than 
individual district) impacts. Consequently, the Court found the 
plaintiffs had no standing to pursue a partisan gerrymandering 
case.243 The conclusion that a plaintiff must live in a district that is 
affected by gerrymandering, which in turn means the plaintiff’s own 
vote has been diluted by partisan efforts, is consistent with the 
standing requirement of a “personal injury.” Absent this limitation, it 
is conceivable that any individual of voting age could bring a partisan 
gerrymandering claim in the State where she or he resides, regardless 
of individual harm. 
To avoid making the requirements for standing overly stringent, 
however, it is critical to place certain terminology from the Gill 
 
 241. Glaze v. State, 909 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Minn. 2018) (“Standing is the 
requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy. To have 
standing on appeal, a party must be ‘aggrieved’ by the underlying adjudication.”). 
 242. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018). 
 243. Id. at 1933. 
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decision into proper context. First, the references to an “individual” 
injury should not foreclose a litigant who does live in an affected 
district from claiming that the injury affects both voters in his or her 
district and in the state at-large. Because voting districts must be 
comprised of relatively equal populations—there cannot be gaps or 
overlaps—a change to one or more congressional or legislative 
districts necessarily affects the surrounding districts of the state.244 It 
is simply not possible to change only the boundaries of one single 
district. Accordingly, the effect of gerrymandering on one district 
cannot be separated from its effect on districts throughout the 
state.245 
Further, it is critical to acknowledge the important difference 
between the lead plaintiff “expressly acknowledg[ing] that [the 
redistricting plan in question] did not affect the weight of his vote,” 
and the Court’s note that the lead plaintiff also acknowledged that his 
district would be “under any plausible circumstances, a heavily 
Democratic district.”246 While an acknowledgement that there is no 
impact to one’s vote obviates any claim of standing, a plaintiff would 
arguably still have standing to bring a partisan gerrymandering claim 
where vote weight was affected, but the outcome of the election was 
not changed because the district leans heavily toward one party. This 
is because packing Democratic voters into one district may not affect 
the ability of a voter in that district to elect a Democrat, but would 
have the effect of “wasting” Democratic votes on a statewide basis. 
Almost by definition, packing voters into one district has the effect of 
cracking voters of another party into a different district to maximize 
the impact on multiple districts.247 A prevailing plaintiff ultimately 
must, of course, offer proof that such vote wasting actually 
occurred.248 But for standing purposes, evidence that a district was 
intentionally and/or more materially tilted to one political party 
should be sufficient.249 
 
 244. See id. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining that with enough plaintiffs 
attacking individual districts in a statewide gerrymander, the “obligatory revisions 
could amount to a wholesale restructuring of the State’s districting plan”). 
 245. For instance, compare a lead plaintiff acknowledgement that his own ability 
to elect a Democrat in his district was not affected, to another plaintiffs’ decision to 
focus on proving a statewide impact at trial instead of the impact on their own district. 
These claims should be considered inseparable from the outcome of Gill. 
 246. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924, 1932. 
 247. Id. at 1924. 
 248. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986). 
 249. Id. at 127. 
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Finally, the requirement of an “individual” voter injury should 
not be taken too literally. Gerrymandering by definition targets 
groups of voters to achieve an outcome within a district or state.250 
The partisan mapmaker’s focus on a particular political party of which 
the plaintiff is a member, and the effect of partisan gerrymandering 
on the district in which the plaintiff lives, will ultimately have the 
effect of diluting the power of individual votes.251 Further, it is almost 
impossible to suggest that a map was drawn to affect one individual 
voter when, by definition, the gerrymandering party is attempting to 
move sufficient votes around to make a difference in an election.252 As 
such, the focus of the Gill decision on an “individual injury” should not 
be construed too narrowly. 
This approach to standing is consistent with the concurring 
opinion of Justice Kagan in the Gill decision.253 Specifically, Justice 
Kagan joined in the Court’s finding that no standing existed, but stated 
in her concurrence that: 
This Court has explicitly recognized the relevance of such 
statewide evidence in addressing racial gerrymandering 
claims of a district-specific nature. “Voters,” we held, “of 
course present statewide evidence in order to prove racial 
gerrymandering in a particular district.” And in particular, 
“such evidence is perfectly relevant” to showing that 
mapmakers had an invidious “motive” in drawing the lines 
of “multiple districts in the State.” The same should be true 
for partisan gerrymandering. 
Similarly, cases like this one might warrant a statewide 
remedy.254 
While one could argue in Gill—as the majority did—whether 
Justice Kagan’s concurrence was necessary under the limited holding 
of the case,255 the standing issue and Justice Kagan’s concurrence 
serve two important purposes in the context of this article. First, Gill 
illustrates a decision in which the Court took appropriate, largely 
neutral steps to avoid becoming overly entangled in the “political 
 
 250. See Joann D. Jamuf, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”: The Current State of 
Partisan Gerrymandering, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 168 (2005). 
 251. See id. at 169–70. 
 252. Id. at 209–10. 
 253. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934–41 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 254. Id. at 1937 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1265, 1267 (2015)). 
 255. Id. at 1931. 
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thicket” of partisan gerrymandering.256 To the extent that media 
criticism of the Court occurred following the Gill decision, it focused 
largely on a desire for more clarity around partisan gerrymandering 
standards, rather than on whether the Court was being overly-
partisan as in other recent cases described earlier in this article.257 
Adhering to standing requirements—especially in such politically-
charged circumstances—is a good thing. 
Second, and perhaps conversely, the standing discussion in the 
Gill opinion underscores that there are limits on the extent to which 
the Court can—or should—avoid partisan gerrymandering claims on 
standing grounds.258 The inverse of the Gill decision would be the 
argument that a plaintiff who lives in a district in which her votes were 
diluted should have standing to state a partisan gerrymandering 
claim. Where a plaintiff has standing to be heard on a legal question 
involving the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and the right 
to suffrage, one might argue the judiciary should address those legal 
questions and important rights. The next question, then, is whether 
such a claim can be justiciable pursuant to an articulable judicial 
standard. 
b. To assess credibility of redistricting plans, look to states’ 
neutral redistricting criteria for drafting plans 
As previously discussed in this article,259 a plurality of the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Bandemer that partisan redistricting 
claims are justiciable,260 while the plurality in Vieth stated that they 
are not.261 In addition, the Vieth plurality argued that no federal court 
has identified a manageable standard for evaluating partisan 
gerrymandering, and largely rejected a standard based on evidence of 
intent to gerrymander, actual effect on an overall plan, or a general 
assessment of compactness, contiguity, and other neutral 
redistricting criteria.262 The Vieth plurality likewise rejected 
 
 256. See id. at 1933–34. 
 257. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Stays Out of Merits on Partisan 
Gerrymandering, at Least For Now, SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2018, 1:40 pm), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-stays-out-of-merits-
on-partisan-gerrymandering-at-least-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/JE7D-F333]. 
 258. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929. 
 259. See supra Part III.C. 
 260. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986). 
 261. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004). 
 262. Id. at 305–06. 
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standards for assessing partisan gerrymandering that focused 
generally on “fairness” and the “totality of the circumstances.”263 
Given the inherently political nature of redistricting, the standard 
for establishing that a map is unconstitutionally partisan should be 
based on a clear, and relatively high, standard. We believe, however, 
that this is achievable. First, the Vieth plurality did not examine in any 
detail how the “neutral redistricting criteria” that state courts have 
successfully utilized to draw largely neutral maps might be measured 
to assess maps allegedly drawn on impermissibly partisan 
grounds.264 
To address these questions, the approaches used by the 
Minnesota Special Redistricting Panel and Pennsylvania court are 
instructive and may present a reasonable solution. Specifically, 
sophisticated redistricting software has now existed for several 
decades265 and allows statistical measurements of redistricting plans 
on several levels—providing objective quantification of how closely a 
plan satisfies fundamental, neutral principles such as population 
equality, contiguity, compactness, alignment with political 
subdivision boundaries, and Voting Rights Act compliance.266 
Further, we can say from experience with Minnesota’s redistricting 
panels that it is manageable for a court to identify a range of 
acceptable measures (e.g., population equality requirements, 
compactness measures, percentage of political subdivision splits) that 
would indicate a redistricting plan satisfies fundamental neutral 
principles. This is, in fact, what the Minnesota Panels did, providing 
maps and associated statistics to show satisfaction of neutral 
 
 263. Id. at 268–69. 
 264. Id. at 305–06. 
 265. See CALIPER, MAPTITUDE FOR REDISTRICTING SOFTWARE, 
https://www.caliper.com/mtredist.htm [https://perma.cc/JH4Y-PZLJ]; see also 
DISTRICTBUILDER, http://www.districtbuilder.org/ [https://perma.cc/GA3B-QMPD]. 
 266. See, e.g., Hippert v. Ritchie, A11-152 (Minn. Special Redistricting Panel Nov. 
4, 2011) (Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for Plan 
Submissions); Zachman v. Kiffmeyer, C0-01-160, at 3 (Minn. Special Redistricting 
Panel Dec. 11, 2001) (Order Stating Redistricting Principles and Requirements for 
Plan Submissions). It is also worth noting that where courts are charged with drawing 
maps from scratch, they may consider more abstract (albeit still potentially politically 
neutral) criteria such as gender, communities of interest, etc. We do not suggest using 
such additional criteria in the assessment of maps for partisan purposes, as these 
categories are somewhat farther removed from the fundamental nonpartisan tenets 
of redistricting, and may not serve to isolate partisan political goals. 
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redistricting criteria. Experts also are available to provide data, 
testimony, and analysis of how these criteria are met. 
There also is evidence of the Supreme Court establishing numeric 
standards related to redistricting. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
previously established exactly such metrics for population equality 
within congressional267 and legislative districts,268 holding that 
districts materially exceeding these thresholds create a prima facie 
case for discrimination.269 Further, it is possible to establish 
standards for compactness, contiguity, and equality of population 
because specific levels were once legislated (though they are no 
longer required by federal statute).270 While it would be ideal to have 
legislation that specifies when a district or plan is overly partisan, it 
can still be said that judicial assessment of, and adherence to, neutral 
redistricting criteria acts as a counterbalance to overly-partisan 
redistricting,271 while failure to adhere to such criteria may indicate 
partisan bias. 
That said, we do not propose specific percentages or numeric 
ranges of acceptable outcomes in this article, as establishing such 
standards could form the basis for a separate article or judicial 
 
 267. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding that the “equal 
representation” standard of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, requires that congressional districts 
“be apportioned to achieve population equality ‘as nearly as is practicable’” (citation 
omitted)); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276–77. 
 268. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (“Our decisions have 
established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum 
population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations.” 
(citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 
(1973)). 
 269. Id. (“A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima 
facie case of discrimination, and therefore must be justified by the State.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
 270. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)-(b) (2012) (barring voting 
qualifications or prerequisites to voting or standard, practice, or procedure which, 
“based on the totality of circumstances, [are] shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation by members of a class of citizen”); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 50–51 (U.S. 1986) (identifying threshold conditions for a court finding that a 
legislative district must be redrawn under the requirements of Voting Rights Act § 2). 
 271. We say “overly” partisan because it must be acknowledged, of course, that 
all redistricting by legislative bodies is partisan to some extent, regardless of how 
compact, contiguous, etc., the district(s) in question may be. The question arises 
solely when such redistricting is so discriminatory as to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (outlining three elements 
the Court uses to determine if redistricting is discriminatory). 
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decision. However, because districts that have the explicit appearance 
of gerrymandering—partisan or otherwise—tend to appear the least 
compact and may tend to divide more political subdivisions, the 
acceptable range of compactness and political subdivision split scores 
should be fairly stringent. Establishing meaningful requirements for 
compactness and maintaining political subdivisions has the further 
benefit of increasing confidence in both the redistricting and judicial 
review processes, since these measures help with the fundamental 
logistics of administering elections, voting, and identifying 
representatives.272 
Additionally, because politics are an inherent part of 
redistricting, and because it is not uncommon for geographic areas to 
swing “blue” or “red” based on groups of people who choose to live in 
the same area, we do not follow the equal population cases that 
suggest the courts may find a prima facie case of discrimination where 
these measures are not met. Rather, we propose a converse approach: 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that any district that 
satisfies these acceptable ranges of neutral districting criteria would 
equate to a prima facie case that no unduly partisan redistricting 
exists, even if the political benefits are largely one-sided. 
Consequently, satisfying neutral redistricting criteria standards 
would present the strong presumption that a plan is not unduly 
partisan. 
Where these criteria are not met, it would therefore still be the 
plaintiff’s burden to prove that their individual district(s) or 
statewide plan were: (1) the product of intentional partisan 
districting meant to waste votes of the opposite political party or 
maximize votes for the party in favor of the districting; and (2) 
successful in diluting one’s ability to elect the party of his or her choice 
 
 272. Compact districts that do not split subdivisions make it easier for cities to 
establish voting locations, reduce the number of different ballots that may be 
required for any particular election, and reduce the cost of vote counting and 
reporting. See Ryan D. Williamson, et al., This is how to get rid of gerrymandered 
districts, WASH. POST (March 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/17/this-will-
get-rid-of-gerrymandered-districts/?utm_term=.20f647f0bf56 
[https://perma.cc/44W3-U842]. Likewise, these same factors make it easier for 
voters to understand who represents them; allow the populations of individual cities, 
counties, and municipalities to have a louder collective impact on their elected 
official; and sometimes simply make it easier to access a polling location. Id. 
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in the district at issue. This is akin to the Davis v. Bandemer plurality 
standard established decades ago.273 
Although the Vieth plurality rejected a test of impact (successful 
vote dilution) based on whether a majority party of the electorate is 
precluded from electing a majority of representatives on the grounds 
that a political majority could not be readily identified, this is an 
overly narrow test of impact. There are two reasons for this 
conclusion. First, as with neutral redistricting criteria, redistricting 
software gathers evidence of political affiliation and voting history 
that politicians and political parties alike use to develop district 
plans.274 That same data can be assessed to determine the extent to 
which packing and cracking efforts occurred. Second, we know that 
studies are regularly conducted that specifically identify the impacts 
of partisan “gerrymanders” on election outcomes. Now, it is possible 
to discern when partisan goals have resulted in wasted votes and 
influence on elections.275 
Accordingly, this suggested standard combines several objective 
measures of partisan discrimination: (1) failure to fulfill neutral, 
applied statistical measures; (2) evidence of intentional 
discrimination; and (3) statistical evidence of wasted votes. When all 
those elements are present, and supported by documentary and/or 
expert evidence, we submit that a finding of unconstitutional partisan 
redistricting does not require definitive evidence that a particular 
election outcome was prevented (which may indeed be a largely 
impossible standard). Nor is the standard judicially unmanageable 
because of a reliance on such abstract concepts as “fairness” or 
“totality of the circumstances.” Rather, when the above conditions are 
met, a court may apply the facts to the law and find that a redistricting 
 
 273. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (concluding that 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering occurs only in the event of “both 
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group”). 
 274. See, e.g., CALIPER, MAPTITUDE FOR REDISTRICTING SOFTWARE FEATURES, 
https://www.caliper.com/redistrictingfeatures.htm [https://perma.cc/NE32-
GYWM]. 
 275. We do not intend to suggest that such data is perfect, nor that past voting 
patterns necessarily determine future party status—or indeed any specific party 
affiliation. But the same can be said of population and demographic data: By the time 
redistricting is underway following each decennial census, the census data is already 
stale. Likewise, incumbent data and political subdivision boundaries are changing all 
the time. 
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plan is overly-partisan and dilutes votes in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Ultimately, however, the goal is neither perfect data nor a perfect 
standard. Perfection has never been required for either judicial 
review of redistricting, nor in many other areas where the Court has 
assessed fundamentally abstract concepts. “Manageable” is, instead, 
more related to “reasonable,” “functional,” “practical,” and 
“achievable.”276 As such, the more important goal—that this article 
seeks to advance—is to create a reasonable judicial check on 
legislative redistricting and the fundamental threats to the right to 
suffrage that redistricting poses. In turn, elections will be made fairer 
as compared to allowing partisan legislative redistricting to continue 
wholly unconstrained. 
2. Address perception of partisan judiciary through drafted 
opinions 
In multiple cases (some of which were discussed above) and in 
media interviews, Supreme Court Justices have bemoaned the public 
perception of the politicization of the Court. Several years before the 
changes brought by Justice Scalia’s vacancy, Merrick Garland’s 
nomination, and Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation process, Chief 
Justice Roberts noted the importance of the Court speaking with one 
voice (when possible) and for the Justices to avoid personal criticisms 
of each other.277 For example, Chief Justice Roberts stated “that every 
justice should be worried about the Court acting as a Court and 
functioning as a Court, and they should all be worried, when they’re 
writing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.” 278 
There is little question that “closely divided, 5-4 decisions make it 
 
 276. Manageable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010). 
 277. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Jan/Feb. 2007), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/305559/ 
[https://perma.cc/YZL4-4SGR] (noting that at the end of the prior term, “[o]pposing 
justices addressed each other in unusually personal terms and generated a flurry of 
stories in the media about the divisions on the Court, especially in cases involving 
terrorism, the death penalty, and gerrymandering. Roberts seemed frustrated by the 
degree to which the media focused on the handful of divisive cases rather than on the 
greater number of unanimous ones, and also by the degree to which some of his 
colleagues were acting more like law professors than members of a collegial Court.”). 
 278. Id. 
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harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution 
that transcends partisan politics.”279 
Yet the Court seems to often decide the most controversial cases 
on precisely that divide—and not just any division of Justices, but 
divisions that have been so frequently perceived to be on “partisan” 
grounds. For many years, this involved one Justice (most recently 
Justice Kennedy, and before him, Justice O’Connor) acting as the 
“swing” vote. As such, the concern is less about whether decisions are 
five-to-four or six-to-three, but rather whether cases are divided 
between the “liberal” and “conservative” wings of the Court.280 
While promoting unanimity and avoiding partisan divides are 
good goals, especially in highly political cases involving alleged 
partisan gerrymandering, even more is required of Justices seeking to 
protect the judiciary. First, judges and Justices who repeatedly decide 
cases on what they know will be perceived to be partisan lines need 
to reconsider which cases they are accepting on certiorari (when 
there is a choice) and how they are approaching their decisions. 
Continuing down the current path of maintaining regular divides 
between the “conservative” and “liberal” wings of the Court will only 
further undermine public faith in the fairness of the judiciary, no 
matter how correct the final decision may be. 
This is not to say that judges should vote in a way they believe to 
be incorrect for the sake of fostering a less divided Court. Rather, 
other, smaller steps may help. There are multiple ways to look at a 
case, and, frequently, multiple grounds on which to decide any given 
case. Moreover, even the occasional decision along the lines of 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, where George 
W. Bush appointee Chief Justice Roberts sided with the “liberal wing” 
of the Court, helps break the public perception that the justices are 
unavoidably divided along party lines.281 
Additionally, Justices—and judges on other courts—should 
explicitly acknowledge the political ramifications of any judicial 
decision on partisan gerrymandering claims. Feigning total ignorance 
of specific political implications while favoring a strict focus on legal 
interpretation or generalizations about political issues set before the 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Adam Edelman, ‘The Decider’: What Kennedy’s Legacy Means for the Supreme 
Court’s Future, NBC NEWS (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/decider-kennedy-s-legacy-
supreme-court-swing-vote-n887166 [https://perma.cc/J94J-W5SX]. 
 281. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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judiciary—as largely occurred in Bush v. Gore—is no longer 
credible.282 This is particularly the case after the recent Supreme 
Court confirmation proceedings, in which now-Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh called out one political party in angry language and 
tone.283 In the shadow of that hearing, it is not enough for the Court 
to simply say in general terms that it is not partisan; these can be 
empty words when the decision itself seems no different from 
congressional votes on important legislation, divided heavily along 
party lines. 
In other words, the opinion or opinions of the Court on politicized 
issues, especially such as partisan gerrymandering, should not only 
acknowledge that they have waded into the political thicket, but 
should also be explicitly clear that the Justices understand a particular 
outcome may feed into the partisan interpretation. The Court, for 
example, could include as part of its opinion an acknowledgment that 
its decision, though grounded in the law, may result in partisan 
criticism. Such an acknowledgement might be something like the 
following: 
We recognize that this outcome (in which a claim of 
[Republican or Democratic] partisan gerrymandering is 
[struck down or upheld]), especially as decided by this 
majority, may be perceived as resulting from a particular 
political influence or a desire to help that political party. We 
have considered whether it is possible to maintain the 
integrity of the Court and avoid that perception—but the 
reality is that this is the right outcome based on the law, 
which does not allow [briefly summarize legal problems 
with alternate outcome]. We acknowledge such issues are 
difficult for the courts and that any decision would likely be 
viewed as if it were political. However, this Court is making 
the decision based solely on the record and the applicable 
legal standard. That is our duty. 
Inclusion of language such as the text suggested above would 
help signal to critics and the other branches of government that the 
Court understands its proper and limited role in resolving political 
disputes. Finally, the Court does not serve itself when a member of the 
Court waits until after a decision is issued to comment that the Court 
should not have decided the issue. A concurring opinion is one thing—
 
 282. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 283. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
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and challenging enough; subsequent comments in the press only 
appear to cast aspersions on other members of the Court. 
Overall, the burden is on the Justices who issue a decision in a 
politically difficult case to act, and they must decide the case in a 
manner that protects the integrity of the Court. Routinely deciding 
cases so that the majority opinion is joined by Justices appointed by a 
member of one political party, while the dissent is authored by a 
Justice (or Justices) appointed by the opposite party, creates the 
impression that partisan politics have overtaken the Court. The 
Justices of our United States Supreme Court, who make critical 
decisions on such important issues to preserve the Constitution, must 
also strive for greater consensus, avoid making personal attacks, and 
focus on preserving the integrity of the judiciary branch. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the judiciary’s ability to assess partisan 
gerrymandering claims, while maintaining public faith in the integrity 
of the courts, depends greatly on the judges’ and Justices’ decisions 
and manner of expressing themselves. Solid legal analysis is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to minimize the political fallout that 
results from wading into the political thicket of redistricting claims, 
especially when motivated by partisan politics. Such decisions must 
have a basis in solid, “neutral” legal analysis, but should also recognize 
explicitly that these cases involve challenging questions that overlap 
with political issues. Moreover, judges involved in these cases should 
take personal responsibility for their reactions and should be 
carefully cognizant that decisions split along perceived political lines 
on a court or panel will have negative consequences for public faith 
and trust in the judiciary. Thus, while courts should not abdicate their 
responsibility to act as a check on the other branches of government 
in partisan redistricting cases, they must proceed with utmost care 
and for the greater good. 
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